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Older adults have been shown to describe their happiness as lower in arousal when
compared to younger adults. In addition, older adults prefer low arousal positive emotions
over high arousal positive emotions in their daily lives. We experimentally investigated
whether or not changing a few words in the description of happiness could influence
a person’s rating of their happiness. We randomly assigned 193 participants, aged
22–92 years, to one of three conditions (high arousal, low arousal, or control). In line
with previous findings, we found that older participants rated their happiness lower when
framed as high in arousal (i.e., ecstatic, to be bursting with positive emotions) and rated
their happiness higher when framed as low in arousal (i.e., satisfied, to have a life filled
with positive emotions). Younger adults remained uninfluenced by the manipulation. Our
study demonstrates that arousal is essential to understanding ratings of happiness, and
gives support to the notion that there are age differences in the preference for arousal.
Keywords: happiness, age, arousal, age-differences, emotion
Introduction
How can happiness be measured in a reliable way? To ask “How happy are you?” is a straightforward
question, and research suggests that this method has high validity. However, more elaborate ways
to measure happiness have also been proposed (see Layard, 2011). During the last decades there has
been an increasing interest in happiness and comparisons of happiness. Some examples are happiness
comparisons based on country of residence, where Danes are among the happiest (Veenhoven, 1995;
Diener et al., 2010); wealth, where wealthier people are shown to be happier than less wealthy people
(Easterlin, 1995; Clark et al., 2008); and age, where younger people are shown to be happier than
older people (Mroczek and Kolarz, 1998; Holahan et al., 2008). Does this mean that to be really
happy one needs to be a young, rich Dane? The answer is probably no. When it comes to age-related
differences in happiness, there are disparities in the findings, and the evidence that happiness changes
as we age has been challenged (see Frijters and Beatton, 2012). Methodologically, the validity of all
happiness comparisons rests on the assumption that “happiness” has the same meaning across all
groups compared, and does not change throughout the lifespan.
Mogilner et al. (2011) investigated how people of different ages described their happiness in
more than 12 million personal blogs, and they concluded that older adults described their happiness
more often as satisfaction (low in arousal) and that younger adults described it more often as
excitement (high in arousal). This is in line with Russell’s (2003) notion that emotions can vary in
both valence (negative–positive) and arousal (low activation—high activation), and that high arousal
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has been argued to be connected to cognitive costs, psychological
costs, and health costs in older adults (Williams et al., 1996;
Bradley and Lang, 2000; Wurm et al., 2004). Kunzmann et al.
(2013), showed that anger (high arousal) decreasedwith age, while
sadness (low arousal) remained stable, and suggested that both
positive and negative high arousal emotions will decline over
the lifespan. Additionally, research has found that older adults
rate their life as more positive, especially when it comes to low
arousal positive affect (Kessler and Staudinger, 2009; English and
Carstensen, 2014). It has also been shown that older adults have a
clear preference for low arousal positive affect over high arousal
positive affect when asked to value their experiences (Scheibe
et al., 2013). In line with these findings, this study aims to
experimentally investigate the impact of an arousal framing on
happiness ratings.
Growing older is associated with decline in deliberative
processes (Salthouse, 1991). It is less clear, however, how
affective and emotional processing changes across the lifespan.
Older adults appear to attend to and remember relatively
more affective content compared to non-affective content (and
sometimes positive content specifically), compared to younger
adults (Mather and Carstensen, 2005). Positivity bias in older
adults, both in terms of positivity enhancements and negativity
reductions, has been demonstrated in various contexts. For
example, older adults tend to prefer positive memories (Kennedy
et al., 2004; Mather and Carstensen, 2005), pay more attention
to positive information (Isaacowitz et al., 2006; Orgeta, 2011),
and are more likely to prefer alternatives that are associated with
positive affect (Mather and Johnson, 2000; Mather et al., 2004;
Löckenhoff and Carstensen, 2007; Kim et al., 2008). In sum,
previous studies have typically suggested that older adults prefer
positive information when compared to younger adults. This
positivity bias would suggest that older adults rate their happiness
as higher than younger adults, however, longitudinal studies have
found that age is associated with less happiness as well as greater
decline in happiness (Mroczek and Kolarz, 1998; Holahan et al.,
2008).
One explanation could be that affective preference is not
only based on valence, but also based on arousal (Russell,
2003). Imagine a choice between talking to a person who will
make you feel frustrated or to someone who will make you
feel bored. If choices among affective states are based on a
single valence dimension, one should expect indifference between
these “equally” unpleasant affects. If, on the other hand, valence
and arousal jointly determine attractiveness, we should expect
that differences in activation would influence the preference
for which person you would rather talk to. Preference for
arousal may also be situational (Västfjäll and Gärling, 2006). In
addition, it has been argued that preference for arousal varies
over the lifespan, meaning that older adults are more prone
to avoid high arousal emotions, when compared to younger
adults (Carstensen, 2006; Peters et al., 2007). In a meta-analysis
based on more than 100 studies, Pinquart (2001) showed
that an age-related decline in emotional experiences is driven
predominantly by high arousal emotions, irrespective of valence.
It has also been suggested that part of the positivity bias might
be attributed to “arousal avoidance” in older adults, as positive
information is less arousing than negative information (Wurm
et al., 2004).
In the present research we examined the influence of arousal
by framing happiness as a low or high arousal state. Based on
Russell’s (2003) notion that preference for affect can change when
arousal changes, as well as previous research on age differences
in arousal preference (Kessler and Staudinger, 2009; Mogilner
et al., 2011; English and Carstensen, 2014), we expect that older
adults will rate their happiness lower when it is framed as high in
arousal (ecstatic), and higher when it is framed as low in arousal
(satisfied).
Materials and Methods
We advertised in a local newspaper to invite participants to a
study of emotions and decision-making. Among 400 respondents,
we randomly selected 250 who were invited to participate in
a study specifically on well-being and emotions. A total of
193 participants (77% of the contacted sample) participated in
the study. Age ranged from 22 to 92 years (M = 56 years,
SD = 20 years; 37% men). The relatively high mean age is an
effect of a higher response rate in older participants compared
to younger participants. All 193 participants were used in all data
analyses.
After completing a page on demographics, age, gender,
education, income and occupation the participants turned the
page and came to the main part of our study. Critical to our
experiment, we randomly assigned participants to one of three
arousal framingmanipulations inwhichwe,with a small change in
wording, changed the arousal level in the description of happiness
written on the top of the page. The definition was stated at the
top of the page and the participants read this definition before
performing the happiness ratings: (1) control manipulation, no
definition was present, only “rate your happiness”; (2) low arousal
framing manipulation, “happiness is to be satisfied, to have
a life filled with positive emotions”; (3) high arousal framing
manipulation, “happiness is to be ecstatic, to be bursting with
positive emotions.” After reading this, the participants continued
to rate their happiness at different time points. Participants
were asked “All things considered, how happy are you right
now?” In addition, we asked how happy they had been 10 years
ago, 1 year ago, and yesterday, as well as how happy they
thought they would be tomorrow, in 2 weeks, in 2 months, in
1 year, and in 10 years. Happiness was rated on a five-point
Likert scale (1 = not at all happy, 5 = very happy). After
answering these questions they turned the page and answered
items about their emotional well-being, such as the SWLS (Diener
et al., 1985). These additional emotion-related questions were
not used in any of our analyses and were mainly added for
face validity as the main part of the experiment was only two
pages.
Results
The participants were well educated (58% had a college or
University degree), with a mean income of 40,000 dollars
(SD = 11,500 dollars), and rated their subjective wellbeing as
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Mean level of happiness plotted over time for participants younger than 55 years (n= 79). (B) Mean level of happiness plotted over time for
participants older than 55 years (n= 114).
average (M = 4.79, SD = 1.33). Age was negatively related to
education (r = 0.37, p < 0.001), but was not related to income
(r =  0.07, p = 0.31) nor well-being (r = 0.10, p = 0.18). To
insure that our randomization worked, we investigated if the
three groups (low arousal, control and high arousal) differed in
education [F(190,2)= 0.05, p= 0.949], income [F(189,2)= F1.71,
p = 0.183] or SWLS [F(2,189) = 0.397, p = 0.673]. We found
no differences; hence, the three groups remained equal except the
arousal manipulation.
We employed a multi level model (MLM) in R-statistics 3.0.2
using the LmerTest package for our analyses (data and R syntaxes
used are available). The dependent variable is the happiness rated
for a specific time, as all participants rated their happiness at
nine time points (the nine time points representing if it was
happiness 10 years ago, 1 year ago, yesterday, now, tomorrow,
in 2 weeks, in 2 months, in 1 year, in 10 years), a repeated
measures method is used. The time variable is included as a
predictor and the participants have random slopes and intercepts
on this variable. In addition, age (z-scored) and the arousal
framing manipulation conditions (control = 0, low arousal  1,
and high arousal 1) are included in the model as fixed predictors.
This means that the model is centered at a participant of
mean age, rating happiness 10 years ago, receiving the control
condition. Figures 1 and 2 depict how participants younger
and older than 55 perceived happiness across time periods.
However, Figures 1A,B are visualizations of mean age differences
(median split); all analyses were made with age as a continuous
variable.
The MLM revealed that the arousal manipulation significantly
influenced the ratings of happiness [B =  0.22, t(189) =  3.59,
p < 0.001], 95% CI ( 0.35, 0.10). The overall negative
influence of arousal on happiness indicates that when described
as high in arousal the overall (average of all nine time
points, for all participants) ratings of happiness were lower
than the control and low arousal manipulation (Figure 2).
More importantly, age interacted with the arousal manipulation
[B =  0.15, t(189) =  2.52, p = 0.013], 95% CI ( 0.15, 0.28),
which indicates that older adults were more influenced by the
manipulation than younger adults. This can be seen by the
clearly differentiated lines in Figure 1B and the influence of the
FIGURE 2 | Influence of the manipulation on average happiness based
on age (n= 193).
manipulation on the average happiness over all nine time points,
as seen in Figure 2. This shows that happiness, when primed as
low in arousal, is rated as higher by older adults and when defined
as high in arousal, is rated as lower by older adults. Younger adults
seem to be unaffected by the manipulation, and additionally the
difference is smallest for people in their 200s and largest for people
in their 800s. No age differences were seen in the control condition
(Figure 2).
In addition, we found that age had a positive influence on
happiness [B= 0.31, t(190)= 5.15, p< 0.001], 95%CI (0.31,0.20),
indicating that older adults rated their happiness as higher
compared to younger (over all time points and manipulations).
The analyses also showed that overall the rating of happiness
increased with time [B = 0.03, t(187) = 3.44, p < 0.001], 95%
CI (0.03,0.01), from 10 years ago, to 10 years in the future
which indicates that participants perceived more happiness in
their future than in their past (see Figures 1A,B). However,
the negative interaction between time and age [B =  0.08,
t(188)= 10.41, p< 0.001], 95%CI ( 0.09, 0.11) indicates amore
positive perception of future happiness among younger adults
when compared to older adults (this can be seen by comparing
slopes between Figures 1A,B).
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Discussion
Our main finding was that older adults rated happiness higher
when framed as low in arousal, compared to happiness framed as
high in arousal. The younger participants remained uninfluenced
by the happiness framing manipulation. In addition, the
manipulation seemed to influence ratings of future happiness
and ratings past happiness in the same way as ratings of current
happiness. These results have several important implications.
First, our results are consistent with the literature suggesting
that older adults tend to avoid high arousal emotions (Pinquart,
2001; Kessler and Staudinger, 2009; Mogilner et al., 2011; English
and Carstensen, 2014). And that older adults have a clear
preference for low arousal positive affect over high arousal
positive affect we asked to value their experiences (Scheibe et al.,
2013).
Second, the fact that a manipulation (changing only a few
words) of how happiness is defined (in terms of low or high
arousal) systematically changed happiness ratings of both past,
current, and future happiness, has important implications for
future research. Our arousal framing manipulation produced age
differences in happiness ratings, indicating that older adults relate
more to happiness as a low arousal emotion and are consequently
less happy with high arousal. Thus, our results are of general
importance for research on age-related differences in emotions
that rely on self-reported emotions (Scheibe and Carstensen,
2010). This could prove to be troublesome as affective measures
are used as global indicators of well-being and health (Diener
et al., 2010), while the mean age of citizens varies in different
countries. To avoid misinterpretations of possible age effects
both high and low arousal positive affect needs to be measured.
In addition, comparisons and meta-studies that mix studies
measuring cognitive well-being (low in arousal) and affective
well-being (high in arousal) could be troublesome. Our finding
suggests that high arousal measures would decline with age and
low arousal measures should increase with age. This could be one
explanation to the puzzle of the relationship between age and
happiness (Frijters and Beatton, 2012).
Our finding fits the literature that suggests that older adults
avoid high arousal emotions. Nevertheless, it could be argued
that our manipulation manipulated other aspects of happiness
than arousal (i.e., intensity). In addition, we cannot know if the
difference represents a change in affect (so that older adults feel
more satisfaction) or a change in rating of affect (so that older
adults only rate their affect higher when described as satisfaction).
Still, the fact that the wording of happiness and description of
happiness-related conditions influence the ratings of happiness
differently in younger and older adults, and produced a significant
age difference, remains.
Future research should investigate possible mediators and
moderators of this arousal avoidance. It could be that it is
not chronological age, but rather psychological age, health,
or cognitive change that is the underlying factor. Carstensen
(2006) suggests that as people come closer to the end of life,
psychological age changes, which leads to a motivational shift
whereby people stop seeking excitement and start caring more
about other aspects of life, such as relationships with people close
to them. This motivational shift could be an explanation for our
finding. Research has also suggested that affective and emotional
processing differences are related to cognitive functioning
(Mather and Carstensen, 2005; Mather and Knight, 2005), and
that distraction of cognitive abilities can reverse the positivity
bias in older adults (Knight et al., 2007). This would indicate
that cognitive decline in older adults is the underlying factor
to emotional and arousal avoidance. Further study is needed to
examine why older adults prefer low over high arousal happiness.
As a final note, further longitudinal research can answer if this
finding is connected to aging effects or cohort effects, however,
today’s researchers of happiness need to consider that the wording
of happiness and happiness-related questions can have different
influences on younger and older adults. Thus, researchers need to
measures affective states both high and low in arousal to be able
to draw conclusions on age-related changes in affect.
In sum, our study shows that a change in wording of items
can accentuate age differences. From a theoretical standpoint, we
demonstrate that both valence and arousal determine preference
of type of affect (Russell, 2003), and that older adults rate their
happiness as higher when happiness is framed as low in arousal.
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